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Introduction 
The regulation of corporate groups is a challenging task. Groups come about in different 
permutations and they often present a tension between the economic reality whereby they 
operate as a single entity and the legal position which allows them to be split into separate 
legal persons.
1
 In the context of cross-border insolvency, groups’ structures present two key 
regulatory challenges. One is how to facilitate an efficient procedural coordination of the 
insolvency proceedings (including group-wide restructurings) where the group is spread 
across different countries; and the other is, how to deal (in the course of insolvency) with 
scenarios of heavily integrated groups whose assets or debts have been  intermingled.  
Although group structures are likely the most common structure for large cross-border 
enterprises, it took international bodies quite some time before they have started addressing 
the matter. UNCITRAL Working Group V (which deals with insolvency law reform) took on 
board to address both the domestic and international aspects pertaining to groups in 2006, a 
project that was finalised in 2010 and resulted in a set of recommendations added to the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.
2
 Yet, the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency (the Model Law)
3
 is still confined to single companies. The EC 
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Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (the EC Insolvency Regulation)
4
 does not deal with 
corporate groups either. The Regulation is now undergoing revision, though, and it is 
expected that some consideration of the group scenario will be taken on board, even if the 
issue may not be fully addressed at this stage.
5
 UNCITRAL Working Group V is now also 
deliberating on the refinement of the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law, specifically in 
relation to the notion of COMI and associated issues, which may have implications to 
groups.
6
 Here too, though, it is expected that the cross-border insolvency of groups will not 
be fully addressed at this stage. Evidently, the regulation of groups is a complex task and 
therefore may require an incremental process, whilst the debate regarding regulating groups 
in insolvency is ongoing. 
In light of these recent developments and the expectation that more will come in terms of 
international development, it is timely and important to assess the proposals of INSOL 
Europe regarding groups. INSOL Europe (“INSOL”) (the European organisation of 
professionals who specialise in insolvency, bankruptcy and business reconstruction and 
recovery) has a leading role in European insolvency and restructurings. In anticipation of the 
revision of the EC Insolvency Regulation (required under article 46 of the Regulation) 
INSOL composed a thorough report with proposed amendments to the Regulation including 
an in depth consideration of the group problem. Its recommendations may, therefore, have an 
impact within Europe (either at this stage of the revision or later on) and beyond. It is also the 
case that any new rules regarding groups that may be enacted by regional or international 
bodies will follow a process of implementation in domestic regimes or application by 
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national courts which will require understanding of the purpose and policy considerations 
underlying the rules. Certain legal regimes are already undergoing consideration of reform of 
their group insolvency laws. Others may follow suit. These initiatives could also benefit from 
the work of organisations such as INSOL, specifically INSOL’s proposals regarding groups. 
This is especially so as the proposals seem to go somewhat beyond mere cross-border 
procedural aspects, and address, for example, the circumstances where substantive 
consolidation should apply. Generally, the proposals could contribute to the general debate 
regarding the regulation of groups in insolvency.
7
 
 
What is in the INSOL’s proposals? 
INSOL’s report deals with the group problem quite comprehensively. One chapter is devoted 
to groups and proposes the concepts of coordination via a group main proceeding and of 
substantive consolidation (Chapter V). Another chapter suggests the concept of EU rescue 
plans specifically targeted at corporate groups (Chapter VI). Further references to groups are 
evident in the proposed amendments to the definitions in the Regulation (Chapter I) including 
that of COMI, which is the focal point of the Regulation. 
Understandably, the proposals do not deal with certain other matters pertaining to groups in 
insolvency such as whether or not to avoid intra-group transactions
8
 or whether to make a 
parent company liable for the debts of its subsidiaries.
9
 These matters are certainly outside 
the purview of the Regulation which is essentially a private international law instrument 
aimed at unifying matters of jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and choice of law. It is 
                                                          
7
 On which see e.g. I Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP, 2009); B. Wessels, 
“Multinational Groups of Companies under the EC Insolvency Regulation: where do we stand?”, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2009-5, 243; N.W. Tollenaar, “Dealing with the Insolvency of Multinational Groups under 
the European Insolvency Regulation” Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht 2010, 94. 
8
 See I Mevorach, ‘Bankruptcy of Corporate Groups and Transaction Avoidance’ (2011) 2 ECFR 235. 
9
 See I Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (OUP, 2009), Ch 9. 
4 
 
even questionable whether it is within the ambit of the Regulation to impose harmonised 
rescue plans and rules regarding substantive consolidation as proposed in the report. Yet, 
what is interesting to consider is not so much the legal instrument for implementing the rules 
but rather the concepts themselves, their rationale and desirability. 
 
Structure, aim and methodology of the paper 
The paper focuses on the proposals of INSOL in Chapter V of its report, namely the concepts 
of coordination via a group main proceedings, and substantive consolidation. Consideration 
of the proposals in other chapters which are also relevant to groups (and to which Chapter V 
itself refers) will be made throughout the analysis where relevant, though the details of the 
proposed EU rescue plan (in Chapter VI of the report) are outside the scope of this paper. In 
the rest of the paper, the proposals regarding coordination and substantive consolidation will 
be first described. It will then be assessed to what extent they can meet the challenge of 
facilitating the resolution of groups’ cross-border insolvency proceedings. This evaluation 
will take account of both the variety of possible group structures and the goals the insolvency 
regime would aim to achieve.
10
 In the process, the merits of the proposals will be revealed but 
also their shortcomings. 
 
An overview of INSOL’s proposals regarding corporate groups 
Appreciating the need to ensure a close and efficient coordination of group proceedings, 
which may take place in multiple jurisdictions, INSOL suggests that such proceedings will be 
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closely coordinated. It is proposed to achieve this by opening what is termed in the proposal a 
“group main proceedings” at the jurisdiction of the “ultimate parent company”.11 
An ultimate parent company is defined as a parent company which has its centre of main 
interests (“COMI”) in the EU and which is subject to insolvency proceedings under the 
Regulation (and which itself does not have a parent company which has its COMI in the 
EU).
12
 Subsidiaries are defined as companies which are owned or controlled by the parent 
company.
13
 The definition of a parent company is taken from the 7
th
 EC Directive on group 
accounts with some modifications.
14
 It is based on the holding of the majority of the 
shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in the other company (i.e. the subsidiary), or (if no 
company meets such definition), having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the 
members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the other company and 
being at the same time a shareholder in or member of that other company, or (if no company 
meets the above definitions), the company that has the right to exercise a dominant influence 
over another company of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract entered 
into with that other company or to a provision in its memorandum or Articles of association.
15
 
The idea is then that the proceedings of the group of companies (defined as a number of 
companies consisting of parent and subsidiary companies)
16
 will be coordinated via the 
control of the ultimate parent’s proceedings, taking place at its COMI. COMI under the 
Regulation is the centre of the main interest of the company which is presumed to be at the 
company’s registered office.17 Otherwise, COMI is not currently defined in the Regulation. 
INSOL suggests to clarify that COMI means (in the case of companies and legal persons) the 
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place of the registered office, except that where the operational head office functions are 
carried out in another Member State and that other Member State is ascertainable to actual 
and prospective creditors as the place where such operational head office functions are 
carried out, it shall mean and refer to the Member State where such operational head 
functions are carried out. Furthermore, where the company is a mere holding company, 
within a group with head office functions in another Member State, the centre of main 
interests (as defined above) is located in such other Member State. It is further suggested that 
the mere fact that the economic choices and decisions of a company are or can be controlled 
by a parent company in another Member State does not cause the centre of main interests to 
be located in this other Member State.
18
 
Additional main proceedings will be opened against the relevant subsidiaries in their 
respective COMIs (based on the same definition, as explained above). The liquidators in the 
group main proceedings and subsidiaries’ main proceedings will be then duty bound to 
cooperate with each other.
19
 Furthermore, the group main liquidator will have powers to 
intervene in the subsidiaries’ proceedings, by analogy to the relationship between “main” 
proceeding (opened at the company’s COMI) and the “secondary” proceeding (opened where 
the company has an establishment) which has a subordinate nature under the Regulation.
20
 
Importantly, the group main liquidator will be able to ask to stay the subsidiary’s 
proceedings.
21
 He may also propose a rescue plan, either based on procedures available in the 
subsidiary’s forum or based on the proposed harmonised EU rescue plan that can be proposed 
for the group as a whole (namely the relevant parent and subsidiaries).
22
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The analogy (to main-secondary proceedings) does not go all the way, though, to allow, for 
example, the group main liquidator to lodge claims of the parent’s creditors in the 
subsidiary’s proceedings, appreciating that the entities are separate and each has its own 
creditors.
23
 In addition, the information to be provided by the liquidator of the group main 
proceedings to liquidators of the subsidiaries is limited to information which is relevant to the 
subsidiary’s insolvency proceedings. There is no obligation on the part of the liquidator of the 
group main proceedings to inform the subsidiary’s liquidator of the progress made in lodging 
and verifying claims at parent level, except where the ultimate parent company and the 
subsidiary are liable for the same debt.
24
  
Finally, it is suggested that in rare circumstances, where the assets, liabilities or agreements 
of one or more group companies cannot be attributed to a single company within a group and 
consequently the insolvency proceedings with respect to these companies cannot be 
conducted in a meaningful way, it will be possible to request the consolidation of the 
insolvency proceedings.
25
 If consolidation is allowed then all proceedings will merge into the 
main group proceedings, unless there is no parent company, in which case the surviving 
proceedings will be those to which the greatest value can be attributed.
26
 The request to 
consolidate proceedings should be addressed to the courts which may lose their supervisory 
role.
27
 Main proceedings opened in jurisdictions other than that of the surviving main 
proceedings, will be converted into secondary proceedings.
28
 The assets and debts are then 
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pooled together, yet the court (of the surviving main proceedings) may take measures in order 
to compensate for any impairment of creditors which result from the consolidation.
29
  
 
Does the coordination regime address all group structures?- the limitations of the 
definition of groups 
As noted above, INSOL’s proposals refer to groups of companies comprised of parent and 
subsidiaries and suggest that proceedings will be coordinated by the main group liquidator at 
the parent company’s COMI. The proposals thus refer to hierarchical pyramid group legal 
structures
30
 of parent, subsidiaries and potentially sub-subsidiaries.  
Indeed, enterprises comprising subsidiaries vertically held by parent companies represent the 
classic traditional and most common group structure.
31
 Yet, groups may take a multiplicity of 
forms including the more loosely connected networks of coordinated economic 
collaborations.32 In these structures the group may still achieve a degree of managerial control 
or otherwise may still coordinate the whole business. An example is a network of affiliates 
(with no principal holding company) linked by means of intra-group holdings operating in 
coordination by meetings of the managements and through interlocking directorships.
33
 Such 
structures are not addressed by the proposed definition.  
Even within the hierarchical structures, the definition limits the scope of the proposal (and 
thus the coordination regime that can apply to group cases) to groups comprising of parent 
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and subsidiaries, namely groups controlled by a legal person or a company. Therefore, 
affiliated (“sister”) companies held together or controlled by an individual shareholder (or 
shareholders) are also excluded from the definition. Another hierarchical structure which is 
not covered as such in the definition is where the enterprise is split organizationally so that it 
is controlled via several sets of management (a twin-holding structure).
34
  
In light of the dynamics of business forms and enterprise structures a broader definition of a 
corporate group should be preferred. A possible definition could be based on UNCITRAL 
recommendations in the new part of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.  
It refers to an enterprise group (rather than a corporate group, to reflect the fact that any type 
of entity could be included) and defines it as: “two or more enterprises that are interconnected 
by control or significant ownership”.35 Thus, instead of defining only the key players in a 
group (a parent and a subsidiary), it defines the enterprise itself, which may take different 
forms, and may not necessarily take the traditional hierarchical structure of a holding 
company and subsidiaries. Entities may be linked by any means of control. An even more ‘all 
inclusive’ definition would be based on coordination as the connecting factor (the link) 
between the entities.
36
 
Finally, in terms of the geographical location of the group entities (in particular the parent 
company which is supposed to serve as the coordinating proceeding), the definition fails to 
take account of situations where all possible parent companies of the group are located 
outside the EU. Since the definition (and the coordination regime) refers only to entities with 
COMIs in the EU, it may certainly be the case that the parent company controlling the 
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subsidiary (or subsidiaries) has its COMI in a country outside the EU. In such a case there 
will be no relevant ultimate parent within the EU that can coordinate the proceedings. 
 
Does the coordination regime maximise insolvency goals, considering different 
functional structures of groups? 
The idea that proceedings opened in different jurisdictions with regard to members of the 
same corporate group will be coordinated by a group main proceeding - opened in one of the 
countries involved in the process, will certainly promote efficiency. Efficiency in insolvency 
entails the maximisation of stakeholders’ wealth by seeking the best solution for the 
enterprise in the course of insolvency and minimising costs involved in the process.
37
 If the 
corporate group was integrated in terms of how it operated its business then most likely the 
group as a whole (or some parts thereof) is worth more than the sum of the parts. Importantly, 
the group’s stakeholders may benefit from a group-wide plan or a sale of the business (as a 
whole, or its viable parts which may cross subsidiaries) as a going concern.
38
 A coordinated 
approach can avoid separate sales of assets resulting from disintegration which may be value 
destroying as was apparent in the case of KPNQwest N.V..39 It can also avoid lack of smooth 
cooperation between affiliates. A notable example (not of an EC Regulation case) is the 
Lehman Brothers case where the UK administrators of Lehman Brothers International 
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(Europe) (LBIE) refused to become a party to a cross-border protocol proposed by the US 
Bankruptcy court.
40
  
In this respect, it is particularly significant that INSOL avoided the more territorialist and 
entity-based solution,
41
 whereby the coordination between the proceedings of group members 
would take place on a completely equal basis, and thus none would have a supervisory or 
coordinating role. Such a solution would still be better than conducting completely separate 
proceedings with no link between them,
42
 but will still entail the problem of lack of central 
direction. In such case, each entity may pull in its own direction and act in a self-serving 
manner even under a cooperative regime. Achieving group wide solutions, especially 
reorganisation, may be much more difficult.
43  
INSOL also avoided, though, suggesting a stronger universalist and enterprise-based solution 
that would direct all relevant group member proceedings (at least in certain cases) to the same 
jurisdiction and promote centralisation of the process. It is explained in the commentary to 
the proposal that INSOL’s aim was to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” solution whereby in all cases 
of groups full centralisation will be applied. Importantly, INSOL noted the problem of 
defeating creditors’ expectations and the possible redistribution of their rights if COMI is 
shifted to the forum of the group centre. It is explained that “contrary to the present situation 
the mere location of the subsidiary’s registered office would no longer suffice to establish 
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with a fair degree of certainty the location of the centre of main interests, and hence the 
insolvency regime applicable to main proceedings.”44 
Indeed, for some types of group (in terms of their functional structure) centralisation of the 
process in a single jurisdiction may not be adequate. This would be the case in decentralised 
groups where subsidiaries had significant autonomy, were separately managed and clearly 
had their own COMI in their local market.
45
 Groups of this sort may take different legal 
forms. Certainly, a classic pyramid group structure may operate either as a centrally 
controlled enterprise or a more decentralised one. Furthermore, parts of a group may be 
closely controlled while certain subsidiaries operate independently. In any event, with regard 
to the decentralised parts, shifting the COMIs of the subsidiaries to some other jurisdiction 
may defeat creditors’ expectations and redistribute rights. It is widely acknowledged that 
respecting pre-insolvency acquired right is paramount to efficiency in insolvency, allowing 
creditors to calculate their risk and avoiding premature liquidations.
46
 
It is also noted in the commentary to the proposals that even if centralisation of the 
proceedings in a single jurisdiction was a viable and desirable solution, it is most likely that 
additional secondary proceedings would be opened. Apparently, this is because “usually the 
subsidiary will still have an establishment in its country of incorporation...”47. In light of 
these considerations (the drawbacks of shifting the subsidiary’s centre), the proposals 
preferred a “less drastic solution”48 whereby multiple proceedings will be opened in different 
jurisdictions and would only be coordinated centrally.  
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The problem with this solution (a coordinated regime of a multijurisdictional process) is that 
we are back with a “one-size-fits-all” approach where we will always seek to decentralise the 
process and have a multijurisdictional proceedings. At least this is the solution envisaged in 
the proposal. Admittedly, it is possible under the proposal to open all the proceedings in a 
single jurisdiction. There is nothing precluding this course of action. However, this solution is 
not the one explicitly suggested. Therefore, parties (as well as courts) following the 
guidelines in the proposals would probably expect to find the COMI of the subsidiaries at a 
place separate from that of the parent’s (most likely the registered office or location of assets 
or creditors). In view of the variety of group functional structures, in particular the fact that 
while some groups may be decentralised many others may be centralised (closely managed as 
a whole from a single head office), the solution must be somewhat more nuanced in order to 
maximise the promotion of insolvency goals. 
The proposed clarification to the notion of COMI (in Chapter I of the report) might further 
diminish the possibility of achieving efficient group centralisations. On the one hand, the 
proposed new definition (delineated above) stresses the importance of the operational 
headquarters in determining the location of the COMI. This factor is elevated above other 
possible connecting factors, such as location of operations, activities, assets, creditors or 
employees. This approach is highly commendable and could be conducive to group 
centralisations, since the operational head office is usually the meeting point of all group 
members in cases of a centralised group.
49
 However, INSOL continues and suggests that the 
mere fact that the economic choices and decisions of a company are or can be controlled by a 
parent company in another Member State than the Member State of the registered office does 
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not cause the centre of main interests to be located in this other Member State,
50
 which brings 
us back to square one. 
This addition to the definition is taken from the ECJ decision in Eurofood
51
 which in 2006 
provided the first ECJ judgement regarding COMI. It was determined in this case that 
Parmalat group’s subsidiary Eurofood’s COMI was in Ireland (when it has its registered 
office) rather than Italy (the group headquarters). In this case, proceedings were first opened 
in Ireland and so Italy had to automatically recognise the Irish decision (as required under the 
Regulation
52
). Yet, the ECJ further explained that with regard to subsidiaries, the fact that 
they are controlled by a parent registered elsewhere may not, of itself and without more,  shift 
their COMI. Other objective factors are required in order to rebut the registered office 
presumption. In particular, the presumption may be rebutted in the case of a company not 
carrying out any business in the territory of the member state in which its registered office is 
situated.
53
 This seems to have done little to clarify COMI as the ECJ did not explain which 
factors could in fact rebut the presumption, and what the important connecting factor between 
a company (including a subsidiary) and the jurisdiction is.  
It can be contrasted, in this respect, with the more recent decision of the ECJ in Interedil
54
 
where a much clearer explanation of the meaning of COMI was provided: 
“... a debtor company's main centre of interests must be determined by attaching 
greater importance to the place of the company's central administration, as may be 
established by objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties. Where the 
bodies responsible for the management and supervision of a company are in the same 
place as its registered office and the management decisions of the company are taken, 
in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, in that place, the presumption in that 
provision cannot be rebutted. Where a company's central administration is not in the 
same place as its registered office, the presence of company assets and the existence 
of contracts for the financial exploitation of those assets in a Member State other than 
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that in which the registered office is situated cannot be regarded as sufficient factors 
to rebut the presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors 
makes it possible to establish, in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, that 
the company's actual centre of management and supervision and of the management 
of its interests is located in that other Member State”55 
 
In a case of a centrally managed group (which in functional terms may operate as a single 
company with branches) the management decisions are typically taken centrally at the head 
office which will be a mutual COMI of the respective subsidiaries. The coordination regime 
suggested in INSOL’s proposal, which is based on decentralisation in insolvency may, 
therefore, result in a mismatch between the economic reality (namely the actual functional 
structure of the group) and the legal solution.  
Finally, the proposal is at odds with the practice. Thus, the experience of applying the 
Regulation shows that (even in the absence of rules for groups) in many if not most cases of 
groups, full centralisation regarding some or all relevant entities of the group was possible. 
Examples are numerous and include cases such as Daisytek,
56
 Crisscross,
57
 Cirio Finance 
Luxemburg SA,
58
 Collins and Aikman,
59
 MG Rover,
60
 Hettlage KghA,
61
 Parmalat Capital 
Netherlands BV,
62
 Aim,
63
 Nortel,
64
 MPOTEC/ EMTEC,
65
 Energotech,
66
 Zenith group,
67
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Lennox Holdings, 68  and Kaupthing Capital Partners. 69  In these cases, the proceedings 
regarding some or all the subsidiaries were conducted from a single jurisdiction -  that of the 
head office of the group, which could be regarded as the COMI of each of the subsidiaries, 
due to the centralised nature of the group. It may not be a mere coincidence that in many 
group cases a mutual COMI could be identified (i.e. that they were centrally controlled 
integrated groups). Indeed, in this kind of functional structures, the likelihood of a group 
collapse is greater.  
It is worth noting that in some of those centralised cases it was also possible to avoid the 
opening of additional secondary proceedings, by sending letters of request, giving assurances 
to local creditors or applying the law of the (potential) secondary forum.
70
 In other words, the 
trend has been thus far one of pragmatism and efficiency, seeking centralisations in 
insolvency and avoiding the opening of multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions in 
cases of groups. Indeed, by avoiding the opening of such multiple proceedings considerable 
costs can be avoided. Clearly, with a concentrated process cooperation is smoother, 
information is more readily available, court hearings can be easily conjoined and so forth. In 
other words, wealth is maximised, which is one of the key goals of insolvency.
71
 There is no 
redistribution of rights or defeat of legitimate expectations either, as the centralisation follows 
the functional reality whereby the entities were centrally controlled. The group centre thus 
matches the entities’ centre, which should be generally apparent to voluntary creditors. In 
borderline cases, it is possible to compensate specific creditors or apply local laws using the 
same mechanisms imposed in cases where opening of secondary proceedings was avoided. 
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The aim and possible mechanisms of avoiding the opening of additional proceedings (be it 
main or secondary), regarding subsidiaries in the jurisdictions where they had economic 
presence (i.e. activities, assets, employees and so forth) is omitted from INSOL’s 
recommendation. There is no clear provision (or even commentary) stating that since COMI 
refers mainly to the objective head office of the company (as INSOL suggests) in cases of 
centralised groups this would usually be the same COMI for all group members. Nor is there 
an explanation or suggestion that in such cases it is further possible to avoid the opening of 
secondary proceedings where it appears that this may not be practical and would incur 
unnecessary further costs. This is peculiar in light of the approach adopted in the proposals 
regarding the opening of secondary proceedings. In the proposed amendments to article 27 of 
the EC Regulation (which allows the opening of secondary proceedings) INSOL suggests that 
courts would have discretion to abstain from opening secondary proceedings. It is not clear to 
what extent this approach could apply to opening main proceedings regarding subsidiaries 
and if so in what ways. The avoidance of centralisation is also at odds with the approach to 
substantive consolidation (which will be discussed below) where there is greater appreciation 
of the differences between groups’ functional structure. There, it is allowed for certain types 
of groups to apply a stronger (enterprise based) solution under which assets and debts will be 
mixed together in the course of insolvency, and to ‘correct’ any ‘errors’ in specific cases by 
compensating the relevant creditors. 
Again, a better approach would be somewhat more nuanced. It would explicitly provide for 
three options. Where the group was integrated and centralised and it is possible to identify a 
mutual COMI for the group members (in the operational head office) then multiple 
proceedings should be avoided. A similar approach is proposed by the European Parliament 
in a draft report with recommendation to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the 
18 
 
context of EU company law.
72
 There, a flexible regime for the regulation of the insolvency of 
groups is suggested. Specifically, it is proposed that whenever the functional/ownership 
structure allows it, proceedings should be opened in the Member State where the operational 
headquarters of the group are located which should then be recognised automatically.
73
 Yet, 
in other cases where subsidiaries were separately managed, a coordination regime of the sort 
envisaged by INSOL would be most adequate. A third scenario is where it is not possible to 
locate a mutual coordination centre, e.g. at the ultimate parent’s COMI,74 in which case 
coordination may proceed on a more equal basis by applying mandatory rules for cooperation 
and coordination. The latter type of solution is also absent from the INSOL’s proposals. 
 
Maximising fairness and efficiency in cases of intermingled groups 
Not many jurisdictions allow for substantive consolidation in their legislation. The concept is 
undoubtedly contentious since it entails the mixing of assets and debts of otherwise separate 
legal entities, ignoring the ‘corporate veil’.75 It means that rights may be redistributed in the 
course of insolvency as ‘unless the asset to liability ratio is equal, substantive consolidation 
will necessarily reduce the bankruptcy distribution to some group of creditors or equity 
owners.’76  
In those regimes that do adopt the doctrine, there is often uncertainty as to the precise 
circumstances where substantive consolidation should be allowed. Under the New Zealand 
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pooling regime, one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether to make a pooling 
order is ‘the conduct of any of the companies towards the creditors of any of the other 
companies’.77 This was interpreted as essentially meaning the degree of confusion of the 
creditors of the companies as to which company they had been dealing with,78 although mere 
reliance by creditors of a company on the fact that another company is, or was, related to that 
company is apparently not a ground for making such an order.79 Under the US bankruptcy 
regime, substantive consolidation may be allowed in cases where creditors of affiliate 
companies have dealt with these entities as a single economic unit, and have not relied on 
their separate identities when extending credit.80 Substantive consolidation is regarded as an 
equitable tool and may also be used as a remedy against improper and misleading corporate 
behaviour.81 Irish law allows, in legislation, ordering the pooling of the assets and debts of 
related companies together whenever this is “just and equitable” (while taking into account a 
range of factors).
82
 
As noted above, INSOL suggests allowing the merging of proceedings only in circumstances 
where the affairs of companies belonging to the same group were intermingled. This proposal 
is very appropriate. It is in this kind of group functional structure (and in this kind only)
83
 that 
substantive consolidation will not result with redistribution and would not be unfair. It would 
also be the least costly course of action, and would not defeat the merits of limited liability 
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and ‘asset partitioning’.84 In those groups that were heavily integrated (in terms of their assets 
and debts) there was ‘a façade of asset partitioning’.85 That is, the evidence suggests that 
there was no partitioning as a matter of economic realities. Furthermore, the intermingling 
between the entities in these scenarios resulted in a situation where all creditors in fact 
belonged to the group as a whole, and therefore a fair distribution means that all assets of the 
group should be available for distribution to all creditors. The claims subject to the 
substantive consolidation order cannot be ascertainable against a specific group member 
(with reasonable effort) and therefore it cannot be shown that a creditor could have gained 
more by remaining ‘attached’ to a particular entity. A substantive consolidation mechanism 
allows for a group-wide distribution (and avoids an arbitrary distribution of assets on a 
member-by-member basis), and also eliminates costs of attempting to untangle the web of 
connections. The possibility to exclude certain entities or certain creditors from the 
substantive consolidation in case their debts were ascertainable
86
 further ensures that there is 
no ‘redistribution’ of rights.87 
The only limitation with INSOL proposals in this respect is where they stress that only in 
circumstances where it is impossible to disentangle the businesses of the relevant group 
members, substantive consolidation should be allowed. Specifically, it is mentioned that 
substantive consolidation should not be allowed when it is only costly to separate the 
business. It must be appreciated, though, that this distinction (between impossible and costly) 
is a very fine one, and one can litigate extensively on whether disentangling is very costly, 
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extremely costly or completely impossible. In this respect it seems that the drafting of the 
recommendation (regarding substantive consolidation) proposed by UNCITRAL is preferable 
as it refers to circumstances where the assets or liabilities of the enterprise group members 
are intermingled to such an extent that the ownership of assets and responsibility for 
liabilities cannot be identified without disproportionate expense or delay.
88
  
It is notable that this solution is gradually gaining support on the international level. 
UNCITRAL has included substantive consolidation in the new addition to the Insolvency 
Guide.
89
 The European Parliament has also suggested (in the draft report to the Commission 
mentioned above), that in circumstances where the assets of the group are so confused that 
the estates cannot be kept separate, substantive aggregation should apply.
90
 
 
Concluding remarks 
No doubt the proposals of INSOL could contribute to reform considerations within Europe as 
well as in other regions or internationally. It can also be a source for ideas for national 
regimes considering reform in this area. Specifically, the concept of substantive consolidation 
suggested by INSOL is very appropriate as it is confined to a limited scenario where the 
group’s affairs were highly intermingled. It is also generally in line with other proposals on 
the international level. It can be predicted that in light of the growing consensus on the 
contours of substantive consolidation, the concept can be taken on board by the Commission 
when revising the EC Regulation. However, it is also possible that substantive consolidation 
will be viewed as a concept that does not fall squarely within the ambit of the EC Regulation 
                                                          
88
 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004, Part III, 
recommendation 220(a). 
89
 See further, I Mevorach, “Is the future bright for enterprise groups in insolvency? –analysis of the new 
recommendations of UNCITRAL on the domestic aspects” in   P. J. Omar, (ed.) International Insolvency Law: 
Reforms and Challenges (Ashgate, forthcoming), available in Nottinhgam University’s ePrints. 
90
 2011/2006(INI), 6.6.2011, part 3, para.1(E). 
22 
 
(which is primarily a private international law tool). If this will be the case, then substantive 
consolidation (and possibly other provisions for groups including the avoidance of 
transactions involving group members and group reorganisations
91
) may be adopted in a 
different regulation or a directive.  
The coordination regime proposed by INSOL is essential, especially in cases of an integrated 
group whose stakeholders could benefit from group-wide solutions. The idea of letting a 
‘group main proceedings’ to coordinate the process will further facilitate such solutions 
(though situations where an EU ultimate parent cannot be identified should also be taken into 
account). However, in many cases groups are centrally controlled in the course of business. 
Therefore, it should be stressed that in these cases a more efficient solution could be achieved 
if a multijurisdictional process is avoided and the proceedings are centralised in a single 
forum. It is very likely that the notion of coordination of group insolvency proceedings will 
be embraced within the forthcoming revised version of the Regulation. Generally, there is 
room for improvement of the provisions regarding cooperation between main and secondary 
proceedings (in single company cases) in the Regulation. Thus, while expanding the relevant 
provisions (e.g. delineating methods of cooperation such as the use of protocols and court-to-
court communication) it is sensible to ensure that they can apply to groups as well, explicitly 
allowing cooperation between parallel proceedings involving members of the same corporate 
group.
92
 As such, it is hoped that the revision will take that additional step and adopt 
INSOL’s idea of allowing coordination by one of the forums. Indeed, even full centralisation 
(avoiding multiple proceedings) in the relevant cases seems an achievable outcome in the 
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current round of amendments.
93
 This is also a solution which has been advocated by the 
European Parliament (centralisation in the operational headquarters, where the functional 
structure allows it).
94
 It, therefore, might not be too far-fetched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93
 See also I Mevorach, ‘European Insolvency Law in a Global Context’ (2011) 7  J.B.L. 666, 675-679. 
94
 See note 73. 
